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The Impact of ‘Equal Educational Opportunity’ Funds: 
A Regression Discontinuity Design
* 
 
Many countries provide extra resources to schools serving disadvantaged pupils. We exploit 
a discontinuity in the assignment of such personnel subsidies in Flanders to estimate the 
impact on cognitive outcomes via a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Because bias can 
be substantial in RD designs, we include a bias correction in the specification of the control 
function. Overall, we find positive effects for mathematics, reading and spelling, but the 
impact is significant for spelling only. The effects are larger for disadvantaged pupils defined 
on the basis of family background, smaller – or less reliable – for low initial performers, and 
again larger at schools that used the resources to foster socio-emotional development. 
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Investing in the human capital of disadvantaged young children is a policy interven-
tion that promotes both equity and e¢ ciency; see, e.g., Heckman (2006) for a sum-
mary. Understanding why disadvantaged children lag behind is therefore crucial to
improve the design of education policies. Jacob and Ludwig (2009) provide three pos-
sible explanations￿ the lack of su¢ cient resources, good practices and good incentives
at school￿ , and they discuss the e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent policy interventions in each
of these areas.
A widespread policy intervention in OECD countries aims to provide extra resources
to schools or school districts serving large numbers of disadvantaged pupils. Guryan
(2001), Card and Payne (2002) and Papke (2005) report on equalization reforms to
narrow the spending gap between the di⁄erent school districts in the US. They ￿nd
evidence that equalization improved test scores and pass rates, particularly for low-
scoring students, and that it lead to a reduction in test score gaps between students
with a di⁄erent family background. Ludwig and Miller (2007) analyze ￿Head Start￿ , a
US federal program to reduce di⁄erences in education and health between young chil-
dren with a di⁄erent family background. They ￿nd a clear drop in mortality rates,
but only suggestive evidence of an improvement in educational performance. Van der
Klaauw (2008a) ￿nds no evidence that ￿Title I￿funding￿ a federal program aimed at
low-achieving students in schools with high concentrations of disadvantaged students￿
, improved student outcomes in New York City public schools. Machin et al. (2004)
report on the ￿Excellence in Cities￿program that targets resources to schools in dis-
advantaged urban areas in England to alleviate underachievement. They ￿nd a positive
but modest impact on test scores and a signi￿cant improvement in attendance for 14-
year-old children. Leuven et al. (2007) evaluate the e⁄ect of two subsidy schemes aimed
at schools with large proportions of disadvantaged students in the Netherlands. They
￿nd no impact, sometimes even a negative one, on a range of test scores. Also BØnabou
et al. (2009) ￿nd no evidence that the ￿Zones d￿ Education Prioritaire￿ , a program pro-
viding additional resources to disadvantaged school districts in France, had an impact
on a range of student outcomes.
We report here on a similar program in Flanders (the North of Belgium) where
schools could receive extra personnel subsidies depending on the family background
of their pupils. This policy measure was one of the three pillars of a broader ￿ Equal
Educational Opportunity￿decree, introduced in 2002 following the alarming signals of
2relatively high inequalities in educational outcomes in Flanders at that time; see, e.g.,
UNICEF (2002). Some of the key features of the educational system in Flanders￿ free
school choice on the demand side, free entry and autonomy on the supply side, and no
central exams￿ can help to explain the combination of high average test scores and high
inequalities.
In this paper, we exploit a discontinuity in the assignment of the extra resources
to estimate the impact on cognitive pupil outcomes via a regression discontinuity de-
sign. Section 2 provides details about the program and the data. Section 3 presents the
empirical set-up, speci￿es the model via cross-validation, and tests the validity of the
identi￿cation assumption. Section 4 shows the results and a ￿nal section 5 concludes.
2 Program and data
We focus on ￿ basic￿education in Flanders: 2349 schools with 33905 full-time equivalent
teachers serving 643769 pupils in pre-primary (3-6 years old) and primary education
(6-12 years old) at the start of the ￿ Equal Educational Opportunity (EEO)￿ -programme.
The EEO-decree of June 2002 stipulates that schools could receive extra personnel subsi-
dies depending on the family background of their pupils. These extra resources are ￿xed
for a period of three years and schools can autonomously decide how to use them, but
within at least one of the following themes: (1) to remedy lags in cognitive development
and to realize value-added, (2) to foster language pro￿ciency, (3) to stimulate a positive
self-image and to improve social skills. To sketch the size of the programme, 4671 extra
full-time equivalent teachers were hired during the ￿rst EEO-cycle (2002-2005) on top
of the 101939 regular teachers for the same period, or a 4.58% increase.
The funding formula was based on a disadavantage index, calculated for each pupil
as a weighted sum￿ with a maximum of 1.2￿ of the following 5 binary pupil indicators
(weights between brackets): the pupil is not living with one of the biological parents
(0.8), the pupil￿ s family belongs to a traveling population (0.8), the income of the pupil￿ s
household consists only of replacement incomes (0.4), the mother of the pupil does
not have a degree of secondary education (0.6), and￿ only in combination with one
of the former indicators￿ the language spoken at home is di⁄erent from Dutch (0.2).1
1Schools have to collect the data and to prove their authenticity via certi￿cates (for the ￿rst two
mentioned indicators) and via written declarations by one of the parents or foster parents (for the last
three indicators).
3Pupils who meet at least one of the ￿rst four mentioned pupil indicators are called
disadvantaged pupils in the sequel. The disadvantage index of a school is the sum of
the indices of their pupils, multiplied by 1.1 if the percentage of disadvantaged pupils
is equal to or higher than 80%, and multiplied by 1.5 if the school lies in the regional
capital of Brussels. The total budget is allocated in proportion to the disadvantage
index of each school, with a minimum of 0.25 full-time equivalents. One interesting
exception applies: schools do not receive anything if their percentage of disadvantaged
pupils is lower than 10%.
To show the sharp discontinuity, we use administrative data from the Flemish De-
partment of Education. This data set contains all schools in Flanders with the percentage
of disadvantaged students (the assignment or running variable), the extra personnel re-
ceived (treatment variable), a location dummy (Brussels or not) and school size. Figure
1 presents the extra personnel subsidies as a function of the percentage of disadavan-
taged pupils for all schools in Flanders during the ￿rst EEO-cycle (2002-2005); the extra
personnel is expressed in full-time equivalents per year per 258 pupils (the median school
size in February 2004).
Figure 1: Extra resources during the ￿rst EEO-cycle (2002-2005)
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Note: bubble size is proportional to school size.
4Figure 1 shows that schools do not receive extra resources if the percentage of disad-
vantaged pupils is less than 10%. The di⁄erence at the cut-o⁄ is equal to one third of
a full-time per year. Above the cut-o⁄ the resources increase approximately linearly,
steeper for schools in Brussels and slightly steeper for schools above 80%. Due to the
minimum amount of 0.25 full-time equivalents some extremely small schools (less than
40 pupils) do receive a relatively large amount of extra resources.
As there are no central exams in Flanders, we use output data from the SiBO-
project aimed at describing and explaining di⁄erences in the school curriculum of a
representative sample of about 4000 Flemish pupils in 120 schools. The data collection
started in September 2002, which is￿ not coincidentally￿ also the start of the ￿rst EEO-
cycle in which schools could receive extra personnel subsidies. We have standardized
test scores in mathematics and language pro￿ciency at the start of the ￿rst cycle (in
September-October 2002, at the age of 5, if not retarded) and in mathematics, reading
and spelling for the same pupils at the end of the ￿rst cycle (in May-June 2005, at
the age of 8). We also have an index of socio-economic status, which is based on the
education level of the parents, the profession of the parents and the household income;
see Reynders et al. (2005) for details. For each school we know the percentage of
disadvantaged students and the extra personnel received. The number of pupils to the
left and right of the 10% cut-o⁄ is equal to 408 and 3400, respectively. In Appendix A
we provide some summary statistics.
3 Empirical set-up
At ￿rst sight, the idea of a regression discontinuity is simple. If schools do not have
perfect control over the percentage of disadvantaged pupils, then the resulting treatment
variation near the cut-o⁄ is as good as randomized; see Imbens and Lemieux (2007),
Van der Klaauw (2008b), and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for overviews. As a consequence,
a regression discontinuity (RD) estimate of the (local) average treatment e⁄ect can be
obtained by estimating ￿ via a regression
si = ￿ + ￿di + ￿i; (1)
on the basis of observations close to the cut-o⁄ (i.e., satisfying c ￿ bw < ai < c + bw),
with si a test score result for pupil i, ￿ a constant, di the treatment dummy indicating
whether pupil i is in a school to the right of the cut-o⁄, ￿i an idiosyncratic error term, c
5the cut-o⁄(10% in our case), ai the assignment variable (the % of disadvantaged pupils
at i￿ s school), and bw the bandwidth, with bw approaching zero.2
If the variation around the cut-o⁄ is as good as randomized, there is no theoretical
reason to include baseline covariates and/or ￿xed e⁄ects. Still, it might help to improve
the precision of the estimates and it can serve as a robustness check; see Lee and Lemieux
(2010). Let si;0 and si;1 denote initial and ￿nal test score results respectively, let sesi
be the socio-economic status and let ui be a pupil-speci￿c e⁄ect. If
si;0 = ￿0 + ￿0sesi + ui + ￿i;0; (2)
si;1 = ￿1 + ￿di + ￿si;0 + ￿1sesi + ui + ￿i;1; (3)
then we can di⁄erence out the pupil-speci￿c e⁄ect to estimate ￿ via
￿si = si;1 ￿ si;0 = ￿￿ + ￿di + ￿si;0 + ￿￿sesi + ￿￿i; (4)
again on the basis of observations satisfying c￿bw < ai < c+bw. We call the estimate
of ￿ via (4) a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DID) estimate, here corrected for initial test score
and socio-economic status.
Before we present the RD and DID estimates of the local treatment e⁄ect, two
questions have to be answered. Is the identi￿cation assumption of imperfect control
valid? And how can we estimate the treatment e⁄ect ￿near the cut-o⁄￿ ? We start with
the last question because we need it to handle the ￿rst one.
3.1 Bandwidth and control function
How can we estimate the treatment e⁄ect ￿near the cut-o⁄￿ ? We face a classic bias-
variance trade-o⁄. Too narrow a bandwidth is not feasible in practice because there are
either no observations, or too little observations to obtain a reliable estimate. But the
wider the bandwidth, the more (negatively) biased our estimate will be, because test
scores decrease on average with the percentage of disadvantaged pupils at school.
Imbens & Lemieux (2008) show that the bias in RD designs is likely to be substan-
tial. Therefore, we follow the literature and add a control function￿ a function of the
2Because the treatment variable￿ the number of full-time equivalents￿ is continuous, we can also
estimate the e⁄ect of the treatment variable, instrumented by the treatment dummy. Due to the fact that
the resulting IV-estimate is equal to ￿ in equation (1) divided by the number of full-time equivalents
at the cut-o⁄ (approximately 0.4 in the SiBO sample), and because the signi￿cance is not a⁄ected
substantially, we do not report the IV estimates.
6assignment variable￿ to the right-hand side of equations (1) and (4). We use a polyno-
mial of order o = 0;1;2::: and we allow some of the parameters to be di⁄erent on both
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0 is relevant for our purposes.
Choosing an optimal speci￿cation for ￿￿0 is equivalent to specifying an optimal bias-
correction as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to measure e¢ ciency in a production
context.
Inspired by Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and Lee and Lemieux (2010), and to better
mimick the estimation process in (1) or (4), we propose a ￿ leave-two-out￿cross-validation
to assess the predictive performance of di⁄erent choices for (bw;o;￿￿0).3 First, choose a
speci￿cation (bw;o;￿￿0).4 Second, select a pair of schools, one to the left and one to the
right of the cut-o⁄, and let a‘ and ar denote their percentage of disadvantaged students.
Third, use all observations with assignment levels in [a‘ ￿ bw;a‘[ [ ]ar;ar + bw] to
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as a control function.5 This provides us with a prediction b ￿+￿￿0 of the treatment e⁄ect
that can be compared with the true e⁄ect ￿, being the observed di⁄erence in average
test scores between the two selected schools. Fourth, repeat the previous three steps for
all pairs of schools ￿ close￿to the cut-o⁄ and calculate the mean squared error, i.e., the
average of (￿ ￿ (b ￿ + ￿￿0))2 over the di⁄erent school pairs.6
3Note that the usual leave-one-out procedure performed separately on both sides of the cut-o⁄ does
not take into account the possible correlation structure in the bias. For example, a speci￿cation with
exactly the same bias on both sides of the cut-o⁄ is still unbiased in estimating the di⁄erence, which is
what we are ultimately interested in.
4In principle, one could allow for a di⁄erent bandwidth and a di⁄erent order for the control function
on either side of the cut-o⁄. Experiments with this more ￿ exible speci￿cation do not change the
cross-validation results in a qualitative way.
5Note the di⁄erence between (5) and (6): the cut-o⁄ c is replaced by the new cut-o⁄s a‘ and ar.
6We follow Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and use the median value of the assignment variable on
either side of the cut-o⁄ as border cases to de￿ne ￿ close to the cut-o⁄￿ . Because the bias correction is
sensitive to this choice, we will report sensitivity results in the next section.
7The cross-validation function can guide us in choosing reasonable speci￿cations. In
appendix B we plot the mean squared error as a function of the bandwidth for each
order of the polynomial o = 0;1;2, once without bias correction (dotted lines) by ￿xing





0 the bias correction that minimizes the mean-squared error for a given bandwidth
and order. The di⁄erence between a dotted line and the corresponding full line is the
squared bias.
We retain the following three guidelines. The bias correction can be substantial￿ up
to half a standard deviation￿ , and therefore we will only report results with bias-
correction. Given the bias-correction, the mean squared error remains more or less
stable given a bandwidth of at least 10. We show estimates for bandwidths from 10 to
80 in steps of 10 in the sequel. Given the bias-correction, order 0 typically performs
better than order 1 and order 1 in turn outperforms order 2. As the di⁄erences can be
substantial, we will report results for order 0 in the main text and provide estimates
based on a local linear regression (order 1) as a robustness check.
3.2 Validity
Is the identi￿cation assumption of imperfect control valid? Because the funding rules
were announced in June 2002, but based on pupil data collected in February 2002,
manipulation could only occur if schools anticipated the funding rules (in particular,
the 10% cut-o⁄). While manipulation is therefore less likely in the ￿rst funding cycle
(2002-2005), this is de￿nitely not the case for the second one (2005-2008) as the rules
of the game were well-known.
Direct validity tests look for a discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable
at the cut-o⁄. Indeed, if schools just below the cut-o⁄ would try to get the extra
resources by attracting more disadvantaged students or by manipulating the data, we
should see an ￿ abnormally￿low density to the left of the cut-o⁄ and the opposite to
the right of it. Figure 2 presents the density of the assignment variable in the ￿rst two
cycles for all Flemish schools. There is some indication of manipulation, especially in
the second cycle. But in the ￿rst cycle it is less clear, as expected. To summarize, there
is no strong reason to believe that the RD identi￿cation assumption for the ￿rst cycle
would be invalid, while we have to be much more reluctant to make the same assumption
in the second cycle.
The visual direct validity test is con￿rmed by a more formal indirect validity test that
8checks whether there exist discontinuities in the baseline covariates at the cut-o⁄. The
main drivers of test score results are initial test scores￿ the mathematics and language
pro￿ciency test at age 5￿ and socio-economic status.
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Table 1 presents the estimated di⁄erence in initial test score results and socio-economic
9status for di⁄erent bandwidths.7 The joint null hypothesis￿ i.e., no di⁄erences in the
initial test scores and socio-economic status at the cut-o⁄￿ , is never rejected for the
￿rst cycle (2002-2005).
Table 1: Testing continuity of the baseline covariates in the ￿rst cycle (2002-2005)
bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
math0 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
lang0 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
ses -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
Prob > ￿2 0.20 0.29 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.49
This can again be contrasted with Table 2, presenting estimates of the same di⁄erences
in the second cycle (2005-2008): the null is always rejected.
Table 2: Testing continuity of the baseline covariates in the second cycle (2005-2008)
bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
math0 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18
lang0 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
ses -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.25
Prob > ￿2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
In appendix C we report estimates based on a local linear regression (order 1) for both
cycles. Although the ￿gures can be di⁄erent, the overall picture is the same: no rejection
of the null hypothesis in cycle 1￿ except for bw = 10￿ and full rejection in cycle 2. Based
on these validity tests, we only report estimates for cycle 1 in the next section.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the RD and DID estimates for the di⁄erent standardized test scores.
Almost all e⁄ects are positive, but only the e⁄ects for spelling tend to be signi￿cant.
This overall picture is quite robust. The di⁄erences between the RD and DID estimates
and between the di⁄erent bandwidths are small. In addition, the local linear regression
7We estimate a seemingly unrelated regression with initial test scores and socio-economic status as
dependent variables and the treatment dummy as the covariate; see Lee and Lemieux (2010).
10estimates in appendix C are also similar: with the exception of reading￿ the e⁄ects for
reading become negative, but never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero￿ the overall picture
remains the same. In appendix D we repeat the above RD estimates (in the middle
row denoted ￿ 50j50￿ ) and report estimates when the cross-validation￿ including the bias
correction￿ is based on larger (￿rst two rows) and smaller subsamples (last two rows).
Although the ￿gures change due to di⁄erences in the bias correction, the e⁄ects remain
typically positive, and only signi￿cant for spelling.
Table 3: RD and DID estimates of the treatment e⁄ect
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
DID 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
DID 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.27￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿
DID 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
Next, we want to check whether the treatment e⁄ect is di⁄erent for di⁄erent groups
of pupils. Table 4 presents estimates of the treatment e⁄ect for advantaged (a) and
disadvantaged (d) pupils separately.
Table 4: RD estimates for advantaged and disadvantaged pupils
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
a 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14
d 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.26
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
a -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
d 0.39￿ 0.38￿ 0.36￿ 0.35￿ 0.36￿ 0.38￿￿ 0.36￿ 0.33￿
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
a 0.24￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.27￿￿￿ 0.27￿￿￿ 0.27￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿ 0.30￿￿￿
d 0.38￿ 0.39￿ 0.36￿ 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.29
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
11Due to the small number of disadvantaged pupils in the control group (34 pupils only),
one should be cautious when interpreting these e⁄ects. Still, the results suggest that
disadvantaged pupils bene￿t more from the extra resources according to all tests.
We ￿nd a similar, but less pronounced picture if we look at the dependence of the
treatment e⁄ect on socio-economic status. This stands to reason, because socio-economic
status and disadvantage do correlate: being disadvantaged explains about 37% of the
variation in socio-economic status. We split up all pupils to the left of the cut-o⁄ in
three equally sized groups according to socio-economic status and compare them with
groups of pupils to the right of the cut-o⁄ based on the same quantiles. From Table
5 we infer again that individuals with a low and middle socio-economic status tend to
gain somewhat more for math and reading, while for spelling the evidence is less clear
for pupils with a low socio-economic status.
Table 5: RD estimates according to socio-economic status
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.23￿￿ 0.22￿￿ 0.20￿￿ 0.21￿￿ 0.20￿￿ 0.20￿￿ 0.20￿￿ 0.19￿￿
mid 0.24￿￿￿ 0.23￿￿￿ 0.23￿￿￿ 0.24￿￿￿ 0.24￿￿￿ 0.24￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.28￿￿￿
high 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
mid 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
high 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.25￿ 0.27￿ 0.25￿ 0.26￿ 0.25￿ 0.25￿ 0.26￿ 0.24
mid 0.36￿￿￿ 0.37￿￿￿ 0.39￿￿￿ 0.39￿￿￿ 0.39￿￿￿ 0.39￿￿￿ 0.42￿￿￿ 0.43￿￿￿
high 0.28￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿ 0.31￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿￿ 0.32￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿￿ 0.35￿￿￿ 0.37￿￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
Whereas Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the subsidies have decreased social inequalities
according to di⁄erent de￿nitions, the picture is less clear if we look at output inequalities.
Table 6 looks at the e⁄ect for pupils with low, middle and high initial test scores. For
mathematics we use the initial mathematics scores, while for reading and spelling we use
the initial language pro￿ciency scores to split up the sample in 3 subgroups as before.
With the exception of one estimate for spelling, low initial performers never signi￿cantly
12improve their test scores. Middle as well as high initial performers bene￿t more from
the extra funds.
Table 6: RD estimates according to initial performance
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
mid 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16
high 0.12 0.19￿￿￿ 0.21￿￿￿ 0.23￿￿￿ 0.22￿￿￿ 0.23￿￿￿ 0.24￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
mid 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
high 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.20 0.20￿ 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19
mid 0.39￿￿￿ 0.43￿￿￿ 0.43￿￿￿ 0.43￿￿￿ 0.42￿￿￿ 0.43￿￿￿ 0.45￿￿￿ 0.46￿￿￿
high 0.21 0.24￿ 0.26￿ 0.25￿ 0.24￿ 0.25￿ 0.27￿￿ 0.28￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
This is not necessarily contradictory to the previous tables: for example, being disad-
vantaged is only a weak signal of initial test score performance: it explains 9.46 % and
5.47% of the variance in initial maths and language pro￿ciency, respectively.
Finally, recall that schools could autonomously decide how to use the extra personnel
subsidies, but within at least one of the following three themes: (1) to remedy lags in
cognitive development and to realize value-added, (2) to foster language pro￿ciency,
(3) to stimulate a positive self-image and to improve social skills. In our sample, the
percentages of pupils within these themes are equal to 76%, 52% and 43%, respectively.
Because the themes are chosen by the school, the DID design seems more appropriate
to control for the potential endogeneity problem (but again, RD estimates point to the
same qualitative result).
Table 7 presents the DID estimates of the treatment e⁄ect within the di⁄erent
themes. Schools that worked on remediation (theme 1) did slightly better for math and
spelling, but worse for reading. Schools that focused on language pro￿ciency (theme 2)
did worse, not only for mathematics but, more surprisingly, also for reading and spelling.
Finally, schools that worked on socio-emotional skills (theme 3) always performed bet-
ter, on average at least. The ￿gures in Table 7 are average treatment e⁄ects, so one
13could still wonder whether schools within themes 1 and 2 do better to remedy pupils
who lag behind. In appendix E we present estimates for the di⁄erent themes for low
initial performers only. Roughly speaking, the same picture emerges: socio-emotional
development is more e⁄ective to foster cognitive test scores.
Table 7: DID estimates of the treatment e⁄ect for the di⁄erent themes
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
2 -0.22￿￿ -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
3 0.21￿ 0.19￿ 0.17 0.19￿ 0.19￿ 0.18 0.19￿ 0.19￿
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
2 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
3 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1 0.26￿￿ 0.27￿￿ 0.26￿￿ 0.26￿￿ 0.25￿￿ 0.26￿￿ 0.28￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿
2 0.16 0.16 0.19￿ 0.20￿ 0.19￿ 0.20￿ 0.19￿ 0.19￿
3 0.49￿￿￿ 0.48￿￿￿ 0.46￿￿￿ 0.47￿￿￿ 0.46￿￿￿ 0.44￿￿￿ 0.42￿￿￿ 0.42￿￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
It is not clear to what extent the DID estimates su¢ ciently control for endogeneity,
but the results suggest that fostering socio-emotional skills (e.g., a positive self-image)
is more e⁄ective in improving cognitive test scores. This is in line with the evidence
in Borghans et al. (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) showing that non-cognitive skills
in￿ uence cognitive test scores.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit a discontinuity in the assignment of extra personnel subsidies
in basic (i.e., pre-primary and primary) education to estimate the impact on cognitive
outcomes via a regression discontinuity (RD) design. As bias can be substantial in RD
designs, we propose to include a bias-correction in the speci￿cation of the control func-
tion. Overall, we ￿nd robust positive e⁄ects for mathematics, reading and spelling, but
the e⁄ects are only signi￿cant for spelling. The e⁄ects tend to be larger for disadvantaged
14pupils de￿ned on the basis of family background, and smaller￿ or less reliable￿ for low
initial performers. This suggests that social inequality, i.e., the dependence of outcomes
on family background, has decreased; meanwhile, output inequality, the dependence
of outcomes on initial test score results, has increased. We also ￿nd that the impact
is larger for pupils at schools that used the resources to stimulate the socio-emotional
development of their pupils.
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17A. Summary statistics
Summary statistics
mean stddev min p05 p25 p50 p75 p95 max
math0 4.26 0.87 0.71 2.72 3.70 4.31 4.92 5.59 5.91
lang0 4.55 0.88 1.43 2.83 4.08 4.65 5.15 5.81 6.75
ses 0.06 0.86 -2.36 -1.35 -0.55 0.03 0.68 1.49 2.07
math 9.87 1.00 6.33 8.20 9.18 9.87 10.57 11.50 12.28
reading 3.00 1.00 0.18 1.37 2.27 3.03 3.71 4.63 6.24
spelling 8.84 1.00 3.98 7.29 8.14 8.90 9.37 10.41 12.02
% disadvantaged 21.98 16.61 2.38 6.47 12.58 15.7 25.82 62.73 89.51
# fte teachers 0.82 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.54 0.96 2.50 5.21
Note: Due to attrition, standard deviations di⁄er from 1 for the initial test scores and socio-





















































19C. Local linear regressions
Testing continuity of the baseline covariates for cycle 1 and 2
bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
math0 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05
1 lang0 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.12
ses 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Prob > ￿2 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.35 0.33
bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
math0 -0.25 -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19
2 lang0 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23
ses -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
Prob > ￿2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RD and DID estimates for the di⁄erent test scores
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09
DID 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
reading bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD -0.19 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
DID -0.21 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
spelling bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
RD 0.24 0.26￿ 0.28￿ 0.27￿ 0.29￿￿ 0.27￿ 0.26￿ 0.27￿
DID 0.20 0.23￿ 0.24￿ 0.25￿￿ 0.27￿￿ 0.25￿ 0.24￿ 0.25￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cance at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
20D. Sensitivity for cross-validation percentiles
RD estimates for di⁄erent percentiles used in the cross-validation
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
40j60 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
45j55 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
50j50 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
55j45 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
60j40 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
reading bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
40j60 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10
45j55 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
50j50 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
55j45 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
60j40 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
spelling bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
40j60 0.19￿￿ 0.20￿￿ 0.19￿￿ 0.19￿￿ 0.18￿￿ 0.19￿￿ 0.21￿￿ 0.20￿￿
45j55 0.24￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.24￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿
50j50 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.25￿￿￿ 0.27￿￿￿ 0.26￿￿￿
55j45 0.28￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿ 0.28￿￿￿ 0.28￿￿￿ 0.30￿￿￿ 0.29￿￿￿
60j40 0.32￿￿￿ 0.34￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿￿ 0.34￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿￿ 0.34￿￿￿ 0.34￿￿￿
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cance at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level. In the ￿rst
column the symbol ￿ x￿in the notation ￿ xj1-x￿stands for the percentile used to the left of the
cut-o⁄.
21E. Low performers within the di⁄erent themes
DID estimates of the treatment e⁄ect for the di⁄erent themes for low initial performers
math bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
low 1 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
low 2 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
low 3 0.35￿￿ 0.27￿ 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23
read bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
low 1 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07
low 2 0.10 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16
low 3 0.12 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.17
spel bw = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
low 0.20 0.20￿ 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19
low 1 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13
low 2 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10
low 3 0.46￿￿ 0.40￿ 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.26
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ mean signi￿cantly 6= 0 at the 90%, 95% and 99% con￿dence level.
22